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Abstract
Using an experiment with material incentives, this paper investigates the violation of Lorenz
relations in the case of dominant and single–crossing Lorenz curves. Our experimental design
consists of two treatments: an income distribution treatment and a lottery treatment. Both
treatments were conducted in Italy and Spain. In each treatment, subjects were asked to judge
ten multiple–outcome lotteries or ten n–dimensional income distributions in terms of both ratings
and valuations. This 2 × 2 × 2 experimental design, allows us to investigate the response–mode
(rating versus valuation) and framing (lotteries versus income distributions) eﬀects in subjects’
perceptions concerning the two types of Lorenz relations. We found the existence of a marked
response–mode eﬀect, as only the ratings of the lotteries and income distributions conﬁrm both
Lorenz relations, whereas the valuations violate them. The framing eﬀect is signiﬁcant only for
the Spanish data. For this data the sign of the framing eﬀect depends on the type of the Lorenz
relation considered. For crossing Lorenz curves, a higher conformity corresponds to the lottery
frame, for Lorenz dominance a higher conformity corresponds to the income distribution frame.
Keywords: Income Distributions, Lotteries, Lorenz Curves, Inequality and Risk Aver-
sion, Response–Mode Eﬀects.
JEL Number: C91, D31, D63, D81.1 Introduction
Consider two distributions of payoﬀs, say x and y with the same mean, µ, where the
probability mass of x is concentrated on the higher payoﬀs, while the probability mass of
y is concentrated on the lower payoﬀs. Therefore, x provides a high payoﬀ with a high
probability, and a low payoﬀ with a low probability, whereas y provides a low payoﬀ with
a high probability and a high payoﬀ with a low probability. In this case, the Lorenz curve
of x, L(x), will, in most cases, either dominate or cut the Lorenz curve of y, L(y), from
below.
There are several methods to elicit preferences between two diﬀerent distributions of
payoﬀs: choices, ratings and valuations. The choice method refers to the observation of
subjects’ choices when they are asked to choose the more preferred one from a pair of
diﬀerent distributions of payoﬀs. Under the rating method, subjects are asked to rate
distributions on a point scale. Under the valuation method, subjects are asked for their
monetary values assigned to the distributions.1 Traditional economic reasoning rules out
response–mode eﬀects, that is, subjects are assumed to express the same preferences
irrespective of which mode of preference elicitation is applied.
Moreover, when studying subjects’ perception of Lorenz dominance, there are diﬀerent
frames to present to them the diﬀerent distributions of payoﬀs. We will consider here two
of them: lotteries2 and income distributions. In the case a distribution of payoﬀs is pre-
sented as a lottery, the payoﬀs represent the diﬀerent prizes, whereas, when presented as
an income distribution, the payoﬀs represent the diﬀerent income levels. Both frames are
of outstanding economic signiﬁcance. Traditional economic considerations would assume
that, in the case of the lotteries, risk averse subjects would prefer x to y, and, in the case
of income distributions, inequality averse subjects would prefer to become a member in a
society in which income distribution x obtains rather than in a society in which income
distribution y obtains (provided that the subjects have to make their choices under a veil
of ignorance regarding their income level in a particular society).
In this paper, we investigate the response–mode eﬀects in subjects’ perceptions with
respect to Lorenz dominance and single–crossing Lorenz curves. The experimental design
used consisted of two treatments. In the ﬁrst treatment we presented to the subjects
ten multiple–outcome lotteries, and in the second treatment ten n–dimensional income
distributions whose entries corresponded exactly to the entries in the lotteries. In order
1to test whether response–mode eﬀects aﬀect the perception of the Lorenz relationships,
subjects were asked in each treatment to judge each particular lottery or income distribu-
tion in terms of ratings and in terms of valuations. In both treatments we used material
incentives. This paper is a follow–up work of a study on preference reversals between lot-
teries and income distributions (Camacho et al. (2004)). We use the data collected in this
experimental study to investigate subjects’ perceptions with respect to Lorenz dominance
and single–crossing Lorenz curves.
In Section 2 we describe the experimental design. In Section 3 we report our results,
and, ﬁnally, in Section 4 we summarize the main ﬁndings of our study.
2 The Experiment
The experiment was conducted at the ESSE laboratory at the University of Bari in Italy,
as well as at the LEE laboratory at the University Jaume I in Castell´ on, Spain. Subjects
were volunteers recruited from students in diﬀerent departments at these universities.
The experimental design consisted of two treatments, one concerning ten lotteries,
and the other one concerning ten income distributions. Each treatment encompassed two
parts, a rating part, and a valuation part, and in every experimental session only one
of the treatments was applied. We conducted a total of 21 sessions that lasted about 1
hour each. Because of obviously absurd statements, we had to eliminate the data of 3
subjects. This left us the Italian data of 52 subjects for the lottery treatment and of 56
subjects for the income distribution treatment. The Spanish data come from 51 subjects
for the lottery treatment and from 50 subjects for the income distribution treatment. In
order to prevent anchor eﬀects, each subject was admitted to only one treatment and one
experimental session.
We conducted the experiments before the introduction of the euro at the end of the
year 2001. In this way we avoid possible money illusion eﬀects and transitory eﬀects due to
the subjects’ being poorly acquainted with a new currency. For the sake of comparability,
however, in this paper we present all ﬁgures and tables in terms of euros.
For the presentation of lotteries and income distributions we checked several formats,
and found the format based on the design used by Lopes (1984, 1987) and Schneider and
Lopes (1986) to convey best the messages contained in the multiple–dimensional lotteries
2and income distributions of our experiment. The format used for the sessions conducted
in Italy is displayed in Figures 1, 2, and 3. Each lottery and income distribution had the
same expected value of approximately e1,800, save for diﬀerences in rates of exchange and
rounding errors in order to secure decent numbers in terms of the local currencies.3 The
distributions in Figure 1 are negatively skewed, the distributions in Figure 2 are positively
skewed, and the distributions in Figure 3 are unimodal, rectangular, and bimodal. The
ordering of the distributions in Figures 1 to 3 was adopted for the presentation of the
results in this paper. The ordering of their presentation for the Italian subjects is shown
in square brackets. The ordering for the Spanish subjects was exactly opposite to the
ordering for the Italian subjects.4 The exact parameters of the distributions (mean,
standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis,5 minimum, maximum, range, and Gini coeﬃcient)
are shown in Table 1.
Insert Figures 1, 2 and 3 about here
Insert Table 1 about here
The lotteries and income distributions can be arranged as Lorenz curves. Two Lorenz
curves either intersect or one dominates the other. We show the types of Lorenz relations
of our experimental design in Figure 4: An increasing arrow means that the Lorenz curve
of the lottery or income distribution in a row cuts the Lorenz curve of the lottery or
income distribution in the corresponding column from below, where intersections within
two percentage points from the lower and the upper bounds were ignored. A horizontal
arrow means that the Lorenz curve of the lottery or income distribution in a row dominates
the Lorenz curve of the lottery or income distribution in the corresponding column. A
tilde means that parts of the corresponding Lorenz curves coincide.
Insert Figure 4 about here
In each session, the subjects were arranged in groups of about ten. At the beginning
of the session, the subjects were asked to read carefully the instructions and the payment
regulations. To make sure that they had properly understood the instructions,6 we re-
quired that subjects pass a test before starting with the experiment. The test consisted
of ten multiple–choice questions, which could be easily answered by any subject who had
carefully read the instructions.7 Subjects were informed that for each incorrectly answered
3question they had to face a 10% cut of their ﬁnal payoﬀ from the experiment. If they
answered 5 or more questions incorrectly, they were excluded from any payoﬀ.8
Recall that we applied two treatments: a lottery treatment and an income distribution
treatment. Within each treatment, the subjects were given two booklets, both depicting
either 10 lotteries or 10 income distributions, as shown in Figures 1 to 3.
Let us ﬁrst consider the lottery treatment. The lottery prizes were arranged in terms of
100 tally marks. Subjects were told that each tally mark, depicted in the lottery ﬁgures
in the booklets, represented exactly one ticket equal in value to the amount listed on
the left hand side of the lottery ﬁgure. For instance, in Lottery 1 there were 31 tickets
bearing the prize “e2,582.28”, 22 tickets bearing the prize “e2,065.83”, etc. These prizes
were paid in tokens. The subjects had an equal chance to draw one of the 100 tickets
in a particular lottery. The subjects were asked to state on a 20–point rating scale their
degree of happiness (1 means very unhappy, 20 means very happy) to play a particular
lottery, in the ﬁrst booklet. In the second booklet, they were asked to state their certainty
equivalents (CEs for short) of the ten lotteries as selling prices. The CEs were elicited by
way of the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) incentive scheme.9
The payment to subjects ran as follows: Concerning the ﬁrst booklet, exactly two out
of the ten lotteries were randomly selected for each subject, and the higher rated lottery10
was played out and constituted one source of tokens. Concerning the second booklet,
one out of the ten lotteries was randomly selected and constituted the second source of
tokens stemming from the application of the BDM incentive scheme. A subject’s total
tokens were the sum of the two token sources. Thus, although a subject’s total of tokens
came only, in eﬀect, from two lotteries, each subject had an incentive to reveal his or her
true preferences and CEs because each lottery had an equal chance of being selected and
becoming the source of a subject’s payoﬀ.
The income distribution treatment diﬀered only in minor points from the lottery treat-
ment. The subjects were told that each income distribution represented a population of
100 million income earners, and that each tally mark in a distribution represented exactly
1 million income earners.11 The ﬁgures represented monthly disposable incomes because
the subjects were more accustomed to monthly salaries in Italy and Spain. The subjects
were asked to imagine that they had an equal chance to become one of the 100 million
income earners in this population, but they would not know ex ante what their precise
4income will be in this population. All they would know was the distribution of monthly
incomes. They were then asked to state on a 20–point rating scale their degree of hap-
piness about becoming a member of a population characterized by a particular income
distribution. The rating scale ranged from 1 (very unhappy) to 20 (very happy).
Thereafter, subjects were asked to imagine that they could alternatively become a
member of a population in which all income earners had the same monthly income. This
income has been termed the equally distributed equal income (EDE for short) by the
profession. They were invited to indicate the level of income at which they would be
indiﬀerent between the respective income distribution and the alternative in which each
income earner received the same income, viz. the EDE.
In contrast to the lottery treatment, the subjects were informed in the income dis-
tribution treatment, that income distributions had to obtain for the group as a whole.
Therefore, one participant in the group would be randomly selected, and, for this partic-
ular person, two income distributions would then be randomly selected. The higher rated
income distribution would become the group’s income distribution, and all the subjects in
this group would be given tokens from independent draws according to this income distri-
bution. Thereby, every subject had to assume responsibility for the income distribution
of the whole group.12 This constituted the ﬁrst source of a subject’s tokens. The second
source of a subject’s tokens stemmed from the application of the BDM incentive scheme
to each subject’s statement about the EDE for the selected income distribution. For
this income distribution, a number was drawn from a uniform distribution deﬁned on the
support of the group’s income distribution; if the number drawn was less than the stated
EDE, then a draw of a new income level according to the group’s income distribution
was made; if the number drawn was greater than or equal to the stated EDE, then the
subject was given tokens amounting to the number drawn. A subject’s total tokens was
then the sum of the two token sources. Notice that every subject had the same chance to
become a random dictator. Thus, each subject had an incentive to reveal his or her true
preferences and EDEs because he or she had a one–in–ten chance to decide for the whole
group.
In both treatments, ﬁnal payoﬀs (in lire or pesetas) were computed by dividing the
total number of a subject’s tokens by 500. The subjects received a mean payoﬀ of about
e6.50.
53 Results
When screening the data, we noticed that subjects made diﬀerent use of the 20–point
rating scale. Some dwelled more on the lower end, some on the upper end, and some
on the extremes. To avoid assigning diﬀerent weights to the subjects, we calibrated the
rating scales, assigning a 1 to the lowest rated lottery or income distribution, and a 10 to
the highest rated lottery or income distribution according to the formula:






where the Ri’s denote the noncalibrated and the ri’s the calibrated ratings.
Recall that all our experimental lotteries and income distributions have the same mean.
Then, for nonintersecting Lorenz curves, risk averse (inequality averse) subjects should
prefer the lottery (income distribution) whose Lorenz curve is closer to the diagonal.13
Risk loving (inequality loving) subjects, should prefer the lottery (income distribution)
whose Lorenz curve is farther away from the diagonal (see Lopes (1984), p. 475).
What about intersecting Lorenz curves of two lotteries or income distributions with
the same mean? Suppose that the Lorenz curve associated with x, L(x), cuts the Lorenz
curve associated with y, L(y), from below. Then risk averse or inequality averse subjects,
who want to avoid the risk of a relatively low prize or income level, should prefer the
lottery or income distribution x, whose associated Lorenz curve is farther away from to
the diagonal at the lower end, whereas risk loving or inequality loving subjects, who
appreciate the chance of a relatively high prize or income level, should prefer the lottery
or income distribution y, whose associated Lorenz curve is farther away from the diagonal
at the upper end (See Lopes (1987), p. 270).
If response–mode eﬀect were absent, then subjects should state their preferences ac-
cording to their risk and inequality attitudes, irrespective of the mode used to elicit their
preferences: ratings or valuations. This does not deny that subjects’ responses may be
aﬀected by a framing eﬀect, in that they exhibit diﬀerent preferences for particular dis-
tributional shapes when they are framed one time as a lottery and the other time as an
income distribution. For instance, a particular subject may, at the same time, be risk
loving when dealing with lotteries and inequality averse when dealing with income distri-
butions. Within a particular frame, however, subjects should state the same preferences,
irrespective of the elicitation mode applied, if response–mode eﬀects were absent.
6Our experimental design allows us to study both sides of the medal: the framing eﬀect
and the response–mode eﬀect. The former is related to systematic diﬀerences between the
perception of lotteries and identically shaped income distributions. The later is related to
the fact that the elicitation mode of subjects’ preferences matters within a given frame.
When response–mode eﬀects matter, Lorenz–dominance or single–crossing Lorenz curves
would be bad proxies for subjects’ preferences because their articulation depends on the
elicitation mode applied.14
Table 2 provides a summary statistics of the subjects’ responses. These data provide
the basis for studying the mean conformity with the Lorenz relations.
Insert Table 2 about here
3.1 Mean Conformity with the Lorenz Relations
Based on the data shown in Table 2, Table 3 shows the conformity rates of subjects’ mean
responses with the Lorenz relations as shown in Figure 4.
Insert Table 3 about here
The entries in Table 3 represent the rates of conformity with the diﬀerent Lorenz
relations that result from the comparison of the ten lotteries or income distributions used
as stimulus material in our experimental design as displayed in Figure 4.
In Table 3, the rate of conformity is provided for the two types of Lorenz relations:
Lorenz dominance and Lorenz cutting from below, and for the two elicitation modes used:
rating and valuations. The entries in Table 3 show the percentages of Lorenz relations
conﬁrmed according to Table 2. The number of Lorenz relations conﬁrmed refer to the
total number of Lorenz relations according to Figure 4: 32 Lorenz dominance relations and
13 crossing Lorenz curves relations, which amounts a total of 45 Lorenz relations. For
instance, the entry 92.3% in the cell “Lotteries/Cutting Lorenz Curves/Ratings/Italy”
means that 12 out of the 13 crossing Lorenz curves relations displayed in Figure 4 are
conﬁrmed according to the mean responses in Table 2 for the Italian data on lottery
ratings. The entries under “All cases” refer to the conﬁrmation rate regarding all 45
Lorenz relations included in Figure 4.
The inverse mirror–image of the ﬁrst two and the second two columns in Table 3 con-
stitutes a strong evidence of a response–mode eﬀect regarding average responses. Note
7that, for the rating elicitation mode, the subjects’ stated preferences conﬁrm the large ma-
jority of Lorenz relations, whereas, for the valuation elicitation mode, we ﬁnd widespread
violation of the Lorenz relations as displayed in Figure 4.
As concerns ratings, the conformity rates of the mean lottery ratings are higher in
the case of crossing Lorenz curves than in the case of Lorenz dominance. This means
that subjects prefer those lotteries in which the probability of the higher prizes is higher.
For dominating Lorenz curves, a conformity rate of 62.5% and 68.7% for the Italian and
Spanish data, respectively, again conﬁrms risk aversion, but in a lower degree. Regarding
the income distribution ratings, the conformity rates for crossing Lorenz curves are again
100% for the Spanish data but only 76.9% for the Italian data, which means less mean
inequality aversion of the Italian subjects. The availability of very high incomes seems to
outweigh their small probability in about a quarter of cases for the Italian subjects. For
dominating Lorenz curves, inequality aversion considerably exceeds risk aversion for the
lottery domain.
As concerns valuations, the conformity rates for lotteries (income distributions) are
at rather low levels: 11.1% and 15.6% (8.9% and 15.6%) for the Italian and Spanish
data, respectively. Inspecting Figures 1, 2 and 3 we can conclude that the subjects are
captured by the top prizes or income levels when valuating a particular lottery or income
distribution. This shows that risk attitudes and inequality preferences are largely aﬀected
by response–mode eﬀects: In the rating mode, subjects’ preferences are more aﬀected by
risk and inequality aversion, whereas, in the valuation mode, subjects’ preferences seem
to be more aﬀected by risk and inequality sympathy. This reﬂects a greater inﬂuence of
the top prizes or incomes levels due to the compatibility hypothesis.15 It predicts that
subjects would pay more attention to the most spectacular (i.e., top) prizes or incomes
in the valuation of lotteries or income distributions as compared to the rating mode, for
which the probability is more compatible.
3.2 Individual Conformity with the Lorenz Relations
Conformity with the Lorenz relations can also be analyzed in terms of individual ratings
and valuations. In this sub–section we look at each subject’s 45 pairwise comparisons of
lotteries and income distributions.
In Table 4 we present a summary statistics of the conformity rate with Lorenz relations.
8This conformity rate is computed, for each one of the 45 pairwise comparisons, as the
mean percentage of subjects whose responses conform with the Lorenz relations.
Insert Table 4 about here
Although the results are less pronounced than with the mean ratings and valuations,
the main results are conﬁrmed.
As far as the response-mode eﬀect is concerned, the majority of ratings conforms with
the Lorenz relations, whereas the majority of valuations violates them.16 A Wilcoxon
signed ranks test shows that the diﬀerences in the conformity rates between the rating
and valuation modes are statistically signiﬁcant.
As concerns ratings, Lorenz dominance is again more frequently conﬁrmed for the
income distributions17 than for the lotteries. This demonstrates greater inequality aversion
than risk aversion for Lorenz dominance. In contrast to that, the rating of Lorenz curves,
which cut others from below, conforms less frequently for income distributions than for
lotteries. This shows that, in this case, fewer subjects exhibit inequality aversion as
compared to those who exhibit risk aversion.
As concerns valuations, the mirror image of the results concerning the ratings is also
reﬂected in the individual data: the valuation rates of lotteries and income distributions
which conform with the Lorenz relations are down by one ﬁfth to one fourth of the
conformance rates of the ratings.
To analyze the framing eﬀect, we compare the conformity rates within a particular
elicitation mode, but between frames, that is, lotteries versus income distributions. In
Table 5 we present the results of a Mann–Whitney test. We ﬁnd that, in the Italian data,
the framing eﬀect is only signiﬁcant for the ratings. In the Spanish data, this eﬀect is
found signiﬁcant in all cases except for the ratings of crossing Lorenz curves. However, this
test is based on the diﬀerences between means when only the framing eﬀect is considered.
Therefore, this test does not allow to diﬀerentiate between both eﬀects. Later on, a more
detailed joint analysis of the response–mode and framing eﬀects will be provided.
Insert Table 5 about here
Concerning the joint analysis of the response–mode and the framing eﬀects, Table 6
shows the results of the estimation using a logit panel data model with random eﬀects
9for the Italian and Spanish data. The dependent variable is the conformity with Lorenz
relations that should assume, for a particular rating or valuation, the value 1 for perfect
conformity with the Lorenz relation, and 0 for perfect nonconformity. The explanatory
variables are two dummies. The ﬁrst, denoted as Mode, refers to the response mode, and
assumes the value 0 for valuation and 1 for rating. The second, denoted as Frame, refers
to the framing used and assumes the value 0 for a lottery and 1 for an income distribution.
Insert Table 6 about here
The results shown in this table18 reinforce our previous ﬁndings. Regarding the
response–mode eﬀect, the coeﬃcient for the explanatory variable Mode conﬁrms that
a strong response–mode eﬀect exists. In fact, the sign of this coeﬃcient indicates that
the probability of conformity with the Lorenz relations increases as we use rating as an
elicitation mode instead of valuation. Moreover, we ﬁnd no diﬀerences between the Italian
and the Spanish data for this eﬀect, since the coeﬃcients for both countries do not diﬀer
signiﬁcantly.19
Regarding the framing eﬀect, the coeﬃcient for the explanatory variable Frame is
nonsigniﬁcant for both countries. However, we know from Table 5, that framing eﬀects
can be more easily observed when we diﬀerentiate between crossing and dominant Lorenz
curves. Hence, we apply logit panel regressions separately to crossing and dominating
Lorenz curves. The results are shown in Tables 7 and 8.
Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here
These tables shows that, although the response–mode eﬀect does not vary between
countries, it is higher20 in the case of crossing Lorenz curves than for the Lorenz dominance
cases. In any case, the probability of conformity of the Lorenz relations is higher for the
ratings than for the evaluations. However, concerning the framing eﬀect, diﬀerences do
exist between the Italian and Spanish data. While this eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant
both for crossing and dominant Lorenz curves for the Italian data, it is signiﬁcant for the
Spanish data. Note, for this case, that the framing eﬀect has an opposite sign for crossing
and dominant Lorenz curves. Moreover, for crossing Lorenz curves, the probability of
conformity with Lorenz relations is higher for lotteries than for income distributions. The
contrary obtains for dominant Lorenz curves, that is, the probability of conformity is
higher in the case of income distributions.
104 Conclusion
Although there is a close relationship between income distributions and lotteries, their
joint analysis is much in its infancy. Moreover, multiple–outcome payoﬀ distributions
have hardly ever been employed systematically and material incentives were only rarely
used.
In this paper we investigate experimentally the violation of Lorenz relations in the case
dominant and single–crossing Lorenz curves using multiple–outcome payoﬀs distributions.
We use as stimulus material diﬀerent types of payoﬀs distributions: three negatively
skewed, four positively skewed, one rectangular, one unimodal, and one bimodal.
Our experimental design consists of two treatments. In the ﬁrst treatment, the ten
distributions of payoﬀs were presented to the subjects as lotteries, whereas in the second
treatment, they were presented as income distributions. In each treatment, subjects were
asked to judge the ten multiple–outcome lotteries or n–dimensional income distributions
in terms of both ratings and valuations (in terms of their CEs or EDEs using a BDM
incentive scheme).
The experiment was administered to more than 200 subjects in Italy and Spain. Sub-
jects’ comprehension of the experimental setting was examined before the experiment
started. In each session only one treatment was applied and each subject was allowed to
participate only in one experimental session.
If no response–mode eﬀect exists, subjects should state their preferences according to
their risk attitude and inequality preference, irrespective of whether their preferences are
elicited trough ratings or valuations. This does not deny that subjects’ responses may be
aﬀected by a framing eﬀect. In fact, they may exhibit diﬀerent preferences for particular
distributional shapes when they are framed one time as a lottery and the other time as
an income distribution. For instance, a particular subject may be, at the same time,
risk loving when dealing with lotteries and inequality averse when dealing with income
distributions.
Our results constitute a strong evidence of the existence of a response–mode eﬀect.
Taking into account average responses, we observe that subjects’ stated preferences con-
ﬁrm the large majority of Lorenz relations when elicited as ratings, whereas, when elicited
as valuations, we ﬁnd widespread violation of the Lorenz relations. This shows that risk
attitudes and inequality preferences are largely aﬀected by the response–mode: In the rat-
11ing mode, subjects’ preferences are more aﬀected by risk and inequality aversion, while in
the valuation mode, subjects’ preferences seem to be more aﬀected by risk and inequality
sympathy.
Regarding individual data, the main results continue to hold, although the eﬀects are
less pronounced than with the mean ratings and valuations.
As far as the framing eﬀect is concerned, a Mann–Whitney test shows that for the
Italian data the framing eﬀect is only signiﬁcant for the ratings, independently of the type
of Lorenz relation. In the Spanish data, this eﬀect is found signiﬁcant in all cases except
for the ratings of crossing Lorenz curves.
Finally, a joint analysis of the response–mode and framing eﬀects based the use of panel
logit regressions reinforces our previous ﬁndings. Regarding the response–mode eﬀect, we
ﬁnd that the probability of conformity with the Lorenz relations increases as we use rating
as the elicitation mode instead of valuation. Moreover, we ﬁnd no diﬀerences between the
countries. Regarding the framing eﬀect, it is only signiﬁcant for the Spanish data: for
crossing Lorenz curves, the probability of conformity with Lorenz relations is higher for
lotteries than for income distributions. The contrary obtains for dominant Lorenz curves,
that is, the probability of conformity is higher in the case of income distributions.
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12Notes
1Note that, whereas the rating and the valuation methods can be applied to larger sets of distributions,
the choice method requires the arrangement of the distributions in terms of pairs, which requires subjects
to make m(m−1)/2 instead of m comparisons for m distributions. Thus, the choice method of preference
elicitation is more appropriate for simple experiments, whereas the rating method is more appropriate
for more complicated experimental designs. Note that both methods are equivalent. Having applied
both methods, Tversky et al. (1990, p. 213) report: “The data reveal no discrepancy between choice and
rating.”
2For an analysis of lotteries by means of Lorenz curves see Lopes (1984; 1987) and Schneider and
Lopes (1986).
3Due to such inﬂuences the average level of entries in terms of euros was some 3.4% lower in Spain
than in Italy. The actual ﬁgures for the means were about e1,807 in Italy and e1,745 in Spain.
4This approach was adopted to control for ordering eﬀects of presentation. Had we presented the
lotteries at random to the subjects, ordering eﬀects would have evened out if they were present. The
comparison of two orderings of presentation allows, however, ordering eﬀects of presentation to be iden-
tiﬁed, or to be out. As shown in our earlier paper (Camacho et al. (2004) Section 3.3), we can rule out
ordering eﬀects of presentation. Only for the distribution ratings did we observe cultural eﬀects for the
Italian and Spanish subjects.
5Kurtosis is deﬁned as the fourth central moment of the distribution less 3 (i.e., the value of the fourth
central moment of a normal distribution with parameters µ = 0 and σ = 1).
6More complicated experiments often suﬀer from the subjects’ being insuﬃciently acquainted with the
experimental design, the experimental procedure, and the incentive schemes. In this case, they become
sources of data distortions which cannot easily be controlled.
7The instructions and the test are available from Eva Camacho, email: camacho@bwl.uni-kiel.de, upon
request.
8Note that this test only served the purpose of inducing subjects to acquaint themselves properly with
the setup of the experiment. Indeed, this precaution worked well: Out of 110 subjects in Italy, only ﬁve
answered only 3 or 4 question incorrectly for the test in each treatment. In Spain only 11 out of 102
subjects answered 3 questions incorrectly in the test in each treatment. All others scored better. This
meant that we could rely on the subjects’ being suﬃciently acquainted with the rules of the experiment.
9This means that for any lottery a number was drawn from a uniform distribution deﬁned on the
support of this lottery. If the number drawn was less than the CE stated for this particular lottery,
the respective lottery was played out and the subject was given tokens amounting to the value of the
respective prize. If the number drawn was greater than or equal to the stated CE, then the subject was
13given tokens amounting to the number drawn. For a more detailed explanation see Becker et al. (1964).
10Ties were resolved by ﬂipping a coin.
11This design was adopted to minimize computational errors. We tried to avoid using diﬀerent dimen-
sions such as having 10 million income earners, and associated tally marks each of which represented
100,000 income earners. Indeed, no subject found this design unrealistic.
12Beckman et al. (1994, p. 8) used a similar assumption to “create a group identity,” but they employed
majority voting instead of a random dictator. This was possible in their experimental setting because
they had only two distributions to choose from for any decision.
13For lotteries with the same mean, a dominating Lorenz curve is associated with a lottery derived from
another lottery by way of a sequence of mean–preserving contractions. In the case of income distributions,
these mean–preserving contractions are nothing else but progressive transfers.
14Another cause may be due to order eﬀects of stimulus presentation. Recall that they were ruled out
for our experiment.
15The compatibility hypothesis was originally developed by Fitts and Seeger (1953) and rediscovered by
Slovic and MacPhillamy (1974). It states that attributes which are more compatible with the dimension
of the response mode are assigned greater weight.
16Except for the income distribution ratings of the Italian subjects in the case of cutting Lorenz curves,
where the conﬁrmation rate is only 48.9%. However, it is still markedly higher than the conformity rate
for valuations.
17In a related paper, Traub et al. (2003, p. 23) observed Lorenz dominance conformity rates of 55%
and 61% for two treatments (self–concern and social planner) regarding income distributions. Their
experimental design was based on asking subjects directly for their preference orderings of twelve income
distributions. This method is equivalent to the rating method of eliciting preferences as used in the
present paper.
18Notice that conformity with the Lorenz relations is either 0 or 1. We model the probability of
conformity as the logistic distribution:
P(Conformity = 1) =
ez
1 + ez ;
P(Conformity = 0) =
1
1 + ez .
The value of z is estimated from:
z = β0 + β1 Mode + β2 Format
using the logit panel data method with random eﬀects. Note that ∂P(Conformity = 1)/∂z > 0, so that
P(Conformity=1) increases as z increases.
1419A χ2-test of the null hypothesis that the values of the two coeﬃcients do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly shows
(χ2
1 = 0.68 (p − value = 0.409)) that it cannot be rejected.
20A χ2-test shows that the null hypothesis that the values of the coeﬃcients for cutting and dominant
Lorenz curves within each country are not statistically diﬀerent can be rejected (The value of the statistic
for Italy and Spain is χ2
1 = 4.16 (p − value = 0.041) and χ2
1 = 15.95 (p − value = 0.000), respectively).
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16Distribution 1 [1] 
 
Prize/income     Tally  marks     Number  of 
        i n   €              t a l l y   m a r k s  
 
2582.28  ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐   31 
2065.83  ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐    2 2  
1549.37  ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐       1 5  
1136.21  ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐         10 
1032.91  ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐              7  
 981.27  ▐▐▐▐▐               5  
 877.98  ▐▐▐▐               4  
 852.15  ▐▐▐                3  
 826.33  ▐▐                2  




Distribution 2 [4] 
 
Prize/income     Tally  marks     Number  of 
i n   €             t a l l y   m a r k s  
 
2117.47   ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐   31 
1962.54  ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐    2 2  
1817.93  ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐       1 5  
1662.99  ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐         1 0  
1508.05  ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐              7  
1363.45  ▐▐▐▐▐               5  
1218.84  ▐▐▐▐               4  
1063.90  ▐▐▐                3  
  908.96  ▐▐                2  
  774.69  ▐                1  
Distribution 3 [5] 
 
Prize/income    Tally  marks   Number  of 
i n   €          t a l l y   m a r k s  
 
2200.11     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐    12 
2127.80     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐    11 
2065.83     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐    10 
2003.85     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐         9 
1941.88     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐         8  
1879.90     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐         7  
1807.60     ▐▐▐▐▐▐         6  
1745.62     ▐▐▐▐▐          5  
1683.65     ▐▐▐▐          4  
1611.35     ▐▐▐▐          4  
1549.37     ▐▐▐▐          4  
1487.40     ▐▐▐          3  
1425.42     ▐▐▐           3  
1353.12     ▐▐▐           3  
1291.14     ▐▐           2  
1229.17     ▐▐           2  
1167.13     ▐           1  
1094.89     ▐           1  
1032.91     ▐           1  
  970.94      ▐           1  
  908.96      ▐           1  
  836.66      ▐           1  
  774.69      ▐           1  
Figure 1: Negatively Skewed Distributions
17 
Distribution 4 [2] 
 
  Prize/income               Tally  marks     Number  of 
         in €                          tally marks 
 
2840.51     ▐             1  
2711.40           ▐▐           2  
2582.28              ▐▐▐          3  
2375.70   ▐▐▐▐          4  
2220.76   ▐▐▐▐▐          5  
2065.83   ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐         7  
1962.54   ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐        10 
1807.60   ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐        1 5  
1652.66   ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐    22 
1497.73              ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐    31 
 
Distribution 7 [10] 
 
P r i z e / i n c o m e       T a l l y   m a r k s      N u m b e r   o f  
          i n   €              t a l l y   m a r k s  
 
5309.18       ▐                   1  
4803.05     ▐▐                   2  
4296.92     ▐▐▐                   3  
3790.79     ▐▐▐▐                  4  
3295.00     ▐▐▐▐▐                  5  
2788.87     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐                 7  
2282.74     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐              1 0  
1786.94     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐             1 5  
1280.81     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐         22 
  774.69      ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐    31 
 
 
Distribution 5 [3] 
  
 Prize/income              Tally marks    Number of 
         in €                    tally marks 
 
2840.51     ▐           1  
2778.54     ▐           1  
2706.23     ▐           1  
2644.26     ▐           1  
2582.28     ▐           1  
2520.31     ▐           1  
2448.01     ▐           1  
2386.03     ▐▐           2  
2324.06     ▐▐          2 
2262.08     ▐▐▐          3  
2189.78     ▐▐▐           3  
2127.80     ▐▐▐           3  
2065.83     ▐▐▐▐          4  
2003.85     ▐▐▐▐        4 
1931.55     ▐▐▐▐          4  
1869.57     ▐▐▐▐▐         5 
1807.60     ▐▐▐▐▐▐         6 
1735.30   ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐       7 
1673.32     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐       8 
1611.35     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐         9 
1549.37     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐     10 
1487.40     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐    11 
1415.09     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐    12 
Distribution 6 [9] 
 
Prize/income    Tally  marks     Number  of 
i n   €           t a l l y   m a r k s  
 
4555.15      ▐      1  
4379.55      ▐      1  
4214.29     ▐      1  
4038.69     ▐      1  
3863.10     ▐      1  
3697.83     ▐      1  
3522.24     ▐      1  
3346.64     ▐▐      2  
3181.37     ▐▐      2  
3005.78     ▐▐▐      3  
2830.18     ▐▐▐      3  
2664.92     ▐▐▐      3  
2489.32     ▐▐▐▐     4  
2313.73     ▐▐▐▐     4  
2148.46     ▐▐▐▐     4  
1972.87     ▐▐▐▐▐     5  
1807.60     ▐▐▐▐▐▐     6  
1632.00       ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐    7  
1456.41     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐    8  
1280.81     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐   9  
1115.55     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐   10 
  939.95      ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐   11 
  774.69      ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐   12 
Figure 2: Positively Skewed Distributions
18Distribution 8 [6] 
 
   Prize/income        Tally marks         Number of 
in  €               tally  marks 
 
2840.51     ▐          1  
2685.58     ▐          1  
2582.28     ▐▐▐          3  
2427.35     ▐▐▐▐▐         5  
2272.41     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐        7  
2117.47     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐       9  
2014.18     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐   11 
1859.24     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐ 13 
1755.95     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐  13 
1601.02     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐   11 
1497.73     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐       9  
1342.79     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐        7  
1187.85     ▐▐▐▐▐         5 
1032.91     ▐▐▐          3  
  929.62      ▐          1  
  774.69      ▐          1  
Distribution 10 [8] 
 
Prize/income       Tally marks        Number of 
             in €                    tally marks 
 
2840.51     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐   13 
2695.91     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐    11 
2551.30     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐        9  
2417.02     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐         7  
2282.74     ▐▐▐▐▐          5  
2138.13     ▐▐▐           3  
2003.85     ▐           1  
1869.57     ▐           1  
1735.30     ▐           1  
1601.02     ▐           1  
1456.41     ▐▐▐           3  
1322.13     ▐▐▐▐▐          5  
1187.85     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐         7  
1043.24     ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐        9  
  908.96      ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐    11 
  774.69      ▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐▐   13 
 
Distribution 9 [7] 
 
Prize/income       Tally marks        Number of 
      in €                   tally marks 
 
2788.87     ▐▐▐▐▐     5  
2685.58     ▐▐▐▐▐     5  
2582.28     ▐▐▐▐▐     5  
2478.99     ▐▐▐▐▐     5  
2375.70     ▐▐▐▐▐     5  
2272.41     ▐▐▐▐▐     5  
2169.12     ▐▐▐▐▐     5  
2065.83     ▐▐▐▐▐     5  
1962.54     ▐▐▐▐▐     5  
1859.24     ▐▐▐▐▐     5  
1755.95     ▐▐▐▐▐     5  
1652.66     ▐▐▐▐▐     5  
1549.37     ▐▐▐▐▐     5  
1446.08     ▐▐▐▐▐     5  
1342.79     ▐▐▐▐▐     5  
1239.50     ▐▐▐▐▐     5  
1136.21     ▐▐▐▐▐     5  
1032.91     ▐▐▐▐▐     5  
  929.62      ▐▐▐▐▐     5  
  826.33      ▐▐▐▐▐     5  










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































201 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 % % → → % % →
2 → → % % → → % → →
3 → % % → → % → →
4 → → → → →
5 → → → →
6 → ∼
7
8 % % → → → →
9 → → →
10 % ∼ →
% ...Lorenz curve of the distribution of the respective line intersects the Lorenz curve of
the distribution of the respective column from below.
→ ...Lorenz curve of the distribution of the respective line dominates the Lorenz curve of
the distribution of the respective column.
∼ ...both Lorenz curves nearly coincide for the lowest 13%.
Nota bene: Intersections of Lorenz curves up to 2% taken from the bottom or the top of the
domain were ignored.
Figure 4: Lorenz Relations of Stimulus Distributions
Distributions
Average Calibrated Ratings Average Valuations in e
Lotteries Distributions Lotteries (CE) Distributions (EDE)
Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain
Negatively
Skewed
1 8.12 7.82 7.14 7.70 1589.99 1704.58 1532.86 1730.24
2 6.53 7.11 6.54 7.30 1673.44 1645.35 1706.41 1741.24
3 5.54 6.45 6.29 6.74 1682.54 1665.48 1801.64 1764.96
Average 6.73 7.13 6.66 7.24 1648.66 1671.80 1680.30 1745.48
Positively Skewed
4 4.99 4.70 6.23 5.61 1802.44 1757.28 1846.43 1841.86
5 4.24 4.29 6.08 4.92 1808.59 1653.86 1853.54 1803.58
6 4.37 4.42 3.65 3.32 1981.59 1836.57 2051.21 2039.45
7 5.30 4.94 3.34 2.92 2096.53 2049.09 2129.63 2211.98
Average 4.72 4.59 4.83 4.19 1922.29 1824.2 1970.20 1974.22
Unimodal 8 5.57 5.12 6.62 6.26 1769.40 1718.61 1853.71 1842.63
Rectangular 9 4.25 4.11 4.28 5.97 1850.54 1768.01 2014.40 1931.13
Bimodal 10 4.89 4.84 3.17 4.20 1759.23 1736.42 1913.46 1827.18
Table 2: Average Calibrated Ratings and Valuations.
21Ratings Valuations
Mode Italy Spain Italy Spain
Lotteries
% 92.3 100.0 0.0 23.1
→ 62.5 68.7 15.6 12.5
All cases 71.1 77.8 11.1 15.6
Income
Distributions
% 76.9 100.0 7.7 15.4
→ 81.3 87.5 9.4 15.6
All cases 80.0 91.1 8.9 15.6

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Ratings Valuations Ratings Valuations
%
Z -3.473 -0.026 -1.517 -2.287
p 0.001 0.979 0.129 0.022
→
Z -3.796 -1.284 -2.889 -3.096
p 0.000 0.199 0.004 0.002
Table 5: Mann-Whitney Test: Lotteries vs. Income Distributions.
Explanatory Italy Spain
Variables Coeﬃcient p − value Coeﬃcient p − value
Constant -0.4344 0.005 -0.4326 0.000
Mode 0.8840 0.000 0.8497 0.000
Frame -0.0289 0.854 -0.0806 0.449
Observations 9090 9720
Number of Groups 101 108
σu 0.5839 0.7003
ρ 0.2542 0.3291
Table 6: Logit Panel Data Model with Random Eﬀects for Italy and Spain: Response–
Mode and Frame Eﬀects.
Explanatory Italy Spain
Variables Coeﬃcient p − value Coeﬃcient p − value
Constant -0.0970 0.014 -0.4455 0.011
Mode 1.003 0.000 1.056 0.000
Frame -0.2321 0.284 -0.5092 0.049
Observations 2626 2808
Number of Groups 101 108
σu 1.1181 1.2831
ρ 0.5556 0.6221
Table 7: Logit Panel Data Model with Random Eﬀects for Italy and Spain: Crossing
Lorenz Curves.
Explanatory Italy Spain
Variables Coeﬃcient p − value Coeﬃcient p − value
Constant -0.5607 0.000 -0.6254 0.000
Mode 0.8944 0.000 0.8484 0.000
Frame 0.1012 0.450 0.3496 0.005
Observations 6464 6912
Number of Groups 101 108
σu 0.5941 0.6881
ρ 0.2609 0.3213
Table 8: Logit Panel Data Model with Random Eﬀects for Italy and Spain: Dominant
Lorenz Curves.
24Individual Conformity with Lorenz Relations
(For the convenience of the referees, not to be published)
In Tables 9 to 12 in the appendix, we present the percentage of subjects whose responses
concerning ratings and valuations conform each one of the Lorenz relations illustrated in
Figure 4. We organized our results for Italy and Spain, for the two frames here considered:
lotteries and income distributions.
We use the entries of these tables to compute the entries included in Table 4 and run
the non-parametric tests used in subsection 3.2. Note that the shaded cells refer to the
case in which the Lorenz curve of the lottery or income distribution in a row dominates
the Lorenz curve of the lottery or income distribution in the corresponding column, to
diﬀerentiate this case from the case where the Lorenz curve of the lottery or income
distribution in a row cuts the Lorenz curve of the lottery or income distribution in the
corresponding column from below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1
Rating 0.680 0.720 0.800 0.780 0.700 0.680 0.780
Valuation 0.380 0.400 0.360 0.260 0.380 0.280 0.360
2
Rating 0.260 0.660 0.580 0.640 0.800 0.820 0.580 0.680 0.800
Valuation 0.440 0.360 0.340 0.440 0.320 0.240 0.340 0.340 0.320
3
Rating 0.260 0.480 0.580 0.760 0.820 0.600 0.620 0.760
Valuation 0.480 0.360 0.520 0.300 0.260 0.440 0.380 0.500
4
Rating 0.560 0.680 0.680 0.360 0.580
Valuation 0.500 0.380 0.220 0.380 0.520
5
Rating 0.560 0.640 0.360 0.520








Rating 0.580 0.620 0.804 0.820 0.580 0.680
Valuation 0.520 0.600 0.411 0.260 0.420 0.440
9
Rating 0.740 0.800 0.640




Table 9: Conformity Distribution (Spain)
11 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1
Rating 0.745 0.784 0.706 0.627 0.784 0.765 0.804
Valuation 0.510 0.529 0.353 0.314 0.490 0.373 0.451
2
Rating 0.275 0.627 0.686 0.706 0.686 0.627 0.667 0.784 0.725
Valuation 0.392 0.412 0.431 0.549 0.431 0.412 0.412 0.451 0.451
3
Rating 0.176 0.647 0.647 0.647 0.569 0.667 0.765 0.647
Valuation 0.392 0.451 0.569 0.490 0.431 0.510 0.412 0.451
4
Rating 0.510 0.490 0.353 0.588 0.392
Valuation 0.647 0.451 0.490 0.392 0.451
5
Rating 0.490 0.392 0.510 0.412








Rating 0.510 0.569 0.608 0.588 0.588 0.471
Valuation 0.529 0.529 0.451 0.451 0.392 0.412
9
Rating 0.490 0.490 0.373




Table 10: Conformity Lotteries (Spain)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1
Rating 0.500 0.500 0.714 0.804 0.464 0.768 0.857
Valuation 0.268 0.214 0.268 0.268 0.143 0.179 0.179
2
Rating 0.304 0.464 0.500 0.482 0.768 0.750 0.429 0.607 0.732
Valuation 0.643 0.304 0.393 0.357 0.411 0.339 0.250 0.214 0.304
3
Rating 0.321 0.446 0.464 0.768 0.768 0.375 0.625 0.768
Valuation 0.768 0.446 0.446 0.393 0.339 0.411 0.339 0.321
4
Rating 0.500 0.679 0.661 0.643 0.732
Valuation 0.464 0.339 0.357 0.357 0.411
5
Rating 0.661 0.696 0.625 0.768








Rating 0.482 0.500 0.804 0.768 0.696 0.857
Valuation 0.482 0.518 0.411 0.411 0.339 0.357
9
Rating 0.571 0.571 0.554




Table 11: Conformity Distribution (Italy)
21 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1
Rating 0.750 0.731 0.731 0.615 0.788 0.788 0.788
Valuation 0.385 0.385 0.346 0.346 0.346 0.385 0.462
2
Rating 0.135 0.596 0.558 0.654 0.692 0.558 0.654 0.654 0.692
Valuation 0.519 0.423 0.481 0.423 0.365 0.385 0.423 0.346 0.423
3
Rating 0.192 0.519 0.558 0.558 0.519 0.481 0.654 0.538
Valuation 0.500 0.451 0.308 0.327 0.327 0.365 0.288 0.404
4
Rating 0.558 0.500 0.423 0.519 0.442
Valuation 0.577 0.442 0.385 0.519 0.500
5
Rating 0.404 0.423 0.442 0.346








Rating 0.596 0.654 0.615 0.558 0.654 0.577







Table 12: Conformity Lotteries (Italy)
3